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A Fragmented World
Cooperation, Conflict, and Conquest 
in Interwar Central East Europe
MIHAICHIOVEANU
"...there is not one of the provinces that constituted 
the Empire of the Habsburg to whom gaining their in­
dependence has not brought the torture which ancient 
poets and theologians had reserved for the damned"
W i n s t o n  CHURCHILL
" ...the germs of war already exist in the region and 
this is a situation which only a betterm ent of eco­
nomic conditions and a more favorable international
atmosphere can rectify"
r  J  O s k a r  JASZI
In the aftermath of the Great War, national revolutions turned Central East 
Europe into a puzzle of independent nation-states. Two decades later, all those 
"heirs" of the former multinational empires of the region hopelessly witnessed the 
collapse of the Versailles peace settlements, the misery of war, and thereafter suc­
cessively experienced two different types of totalitarianism.
From 1918 up to 1938 the region represented the most unstable part of the con­
tinent, a fragmented world dominated by deep insecurity, permanent suspicion, 
and exaggerated claims from all parts1.
The present paper focuses on the twisted road of the independent nation-states 
of Central East Europe from a promising future to a common tragedy. Its first aim is 
to find an answer to two basic questions: 1) why regional cooperation as a proper 
solution to all unresolved problems and tension was not accepted?; 2) are the histori­
cal actors of the region innocent victims of Nazi aggression, or the tragedy of the 
war is the final consequence of their political and economic deeds as well?
The commonly accepted explanation when it comes to the tragic events of 
1938-1940 include: a) the power vacuum created in the region after the dissolution 
of Austria-Hungary, b.) the wide-ranging effects of the Great Economic Depres­
sion, and c) the unexpected resurgence of a militarist, revisionist and expansionist 
Germany. The appeasement policy of the great European democracies and the 
weaknesses of the Nations League are sometimes added in various formulas for 
the same purpose. This interpretation that consider the countries of the region as 
simple borderlands of Germany and Russia, and insignificant elements in the diplo­
matic game of the Great Powers, allows some historians to victimize their nations.
In one of his famous books, Philip Longworth concludes that the independ­
ent states of Central and East Europe must bear, as separated entities, and mem­
bers of the same region, the responsibility for their own failure2. The first part of
1 Vladimir TISMANEANU, Reinventarea Politicului. Europa de Est de la Stalin la Havel, 
Polirom, Iasi, 1997, pp. 29-33.
2 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Eastern Europe, Mac Millan Press, London, 1992, p. 91.
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this paper, which is a short overview of the first decisive decade of 1918-1929, will 
present in general lines the impact of the Versailles peace settlements on the evolu­
tion of the region, the way in which it shaped not only borders but also the political 
decisions of the moment. 1918 represented a national revolution that resolved, in a 
formal sense, the national question but with quite different consequences1. For some 
it meant the accomplishment of the national ideal, new territorial acquisitions or the 
grass root creation of the nation-state. For others it was rather a traumatic change. 
Even in the first case, the achievements proved to be on a long term an ambiguous 
and difficult gift, a Tro jan Horse. Special emphasis is put on "Greater Romania" as 
from this perspective, and in most respects, it represents a paradigmatic case.
The issue of regional cooperation and Danubian confederate projects will be 
discussed on the second part. Different perspectives and visions on the region, in­
cluding German Mitteleuropa, French L'Europe Centrale, as well as Czechoslovak, 
Hungarian, and Polish plans will come under scrutiny. My intention is to under­
line the fact that the traumatic history of the region between the two world wars 
was shaped not only by geopolitics and vested interests, that the "artisans" of the 
failure of regional cooperation, not to mention federal or confederal projects as a 
way to regulate diplomatic relations and offer a base for reconciliation efforts, 
are, first of all, the "little powers" of Central East Europe. At the end, the paper 
will reconsider the expansion of Nazi Germany towards East, a region where, due 
to remnant tensions among the small nation-states and within staled societies, Hit­
ler exploited the absence of any kind of resistance and collective security system. 
What facilitated the task of Nazi Germany when it comes to include some of the 
states into Lebensraum, transform others into satellites and/or unconditional al­
lies, and thus impose its vision on the region, will make my attention.
The Interwar period started as a promising future for the majority of the nation­
alities of Central East Europe. Genuine independence and a form of government 
similar to that existing in Western democracies were to become the new integral 
base of the newly created or geographically redefined states of the region. In many 
cases, the great enthusiasm of the inaugural moment, with its attendant hopes and 
huge expectations, transformed reality into a blurry image. For Thomas Masaryk 
the dissolution of the "semi-autocratic empires" was nothing but the victory of de­
mocracy and the culmination of a long search for humanity, justice and reason.
The nation-states that arose on the ruins of war were the fruit of both the 
military victory of the Entente and the democratic Wilsonian principle of self-de- 
ter mi na tion. The nationalist movements were strong, and their role can not be 
underestimated, but the unexpected triumph of their ideology was forged mainly 
by the interests and needs of some external factors. The allies believed in the de­
mocratic and socially progressive potential of different local nationalisms, but doubt 
the capacity of the states and their pre-eminent bureaucracy to play the role of the 
principal agent of change2. With the exception of Masaryk's Czechoslovakia, and in 
some respects even there, the Versailles system established in this politically back- 
warded region the triumph of some nations upon other, and imposed nationalism 
as the only victorious ideology. Furthermore, national liberation and constitutional
1 See Mikulas TEICH, Roy PORTER (eds.), The National Question in Europe in Historical 
Context, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
2 George SCHOPFLIN, Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1993, p. 5.
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democracy were not enough in order to erase the, sometimes invented, "ugly" 
pasts, nor the destructions and dislocations produced by the war, the structural eco­
nomic difficulties, social imbalance, and the regions' singular political culture.
The new Central East Europe emerged piecemeal from the chaos of the Great 
War itself. Its new map was the outcome of a veritable maelstrom of conflicting 
interests. The number of players was considerable: various nationalist groups, the 
Great Powers divided into two camps, and finally the little states of the region, 
Serbia, Greece and Romania, each with its own vision and claims. Confusion, due 
to the breakdowns in the communication system, was also to play an important 
role to in creating an improper milieu for the emerging negotiations.
In December 1917 the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was not yet part of 
the political agenda of the allies. One month later, in his Fourteen Points Declara­
tion, president Wilson called for the peoples of the empire to be given autonomous 
development and suggested the reorganization of the empire into a federal state 
along lines of nationality1. The resurrection of Poland was also included as a prior­
ity. The Central Powers took note, and tried to anticipate the moves of the allies. 
The Germans set up a Regency Council in Warsaw under the control of Pilsudski as 
a base for a free and independent Poland. At the same time, Austria was declared a 
federal state, and the nationalities were invited to elect national councils in order to 
reorganize the empire. The offer was rejected by both different national movements 
and the allies. Provisional governments were recognized in some cases while in 
others the allies tried to foment rebellious movements among K.U.K. subjects. Un­
der pressure of events Emperor Karl granted recognition to the councils and thus, 
facilitated the transfer of allegiance. The same day Austria became a republic2.
On the Western front, the Armistice signed in Compiegne on 11 November 
1918 put war to an end. In Central East Europe, for the allies, the great difficulties 
were to come from thereon. The Great War took a different turn in the region, and 
degenerated in several local replicas. Bohemia-Moravia, Upper Silesia, Transylva­
nia, the Eastern borderlands of Poland, Slovakia, and Banat, were the main zones of 
frictions between competing provisional administrations, and sometimes real bat­
tlefields for the new national armies. The intervention of the allied troops in those 
conflicts was if not absent than extremely weak and favorable to their little allies. 
When the peace conference concluded its works, with the statesmen gathered in 
Paris hoping that the "new order" will prevent war in the future, the new national 
borders were, de facto if not de jure, already traced. In many cases the "little winners" 
did not wait for the final decision, took from the "losers" all territories that were 
promised to them by the allies before or during the war, and imposed manu military 
their own order. An aggressive mentality, previously associated with the idea of Bal­
kans, was now pervasive throughout the region. "Megali Idea" became the obses­
sion of the moment, and not only in the case of Greece, but also Pilsudski's doctrine 
of "Great Poland", and Brätianu's "Greater Romania". It was the expression of the 
Glory of the National past, and of the new chauvinistic, aggressive nationalism.
The application of the Wilsonian national self-determination principle was 
not as genuine as the defeated thought it will be. The hazard of the armistices, the 
force of weapons, and rewarded fidelity were as decisive elements in this case3.
1 The Public Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, Harpers, New York, 1945, pp. 158-162.
2 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., p. 66.
3 Stephane YERASIMOS, Questions D'Orient: Frontieres et minorites des Balkans au Caucase, 
Editions La Decouverte, Paris, 1993, pp. 9-29.
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The idea of justice for all people and nationalities brought injustice in some cases, 
and strengthened frustrated nationalism in all. Furthermore, the principle was un­
dermined by previous obligations and promises included in the treaties by Great 
Britain and France^Nevertheless, politicians like Edouard Benes and Ionel C. Brä- 
tianu asked for more territories on grounds of historical rights, though this argu­
ment was refused before and during the war. Claims became more and more 
exaggerated when France agreed to sacrifice self-determination in order to trans­
form some of the successor states into viable economic and strategic satellites, able 
to play, for its own good, an anti-German and anti-Habsburg role in the future. In 
many cases the litigations were finally solved long after the Peace Conference 
ended. Inter-state negotiations, force, or, at best, plebiscites, as in Upper Silesia, 
even if the results were falsified in order to integrate this territory within Polish 
borders2, were the main modalities of doing this. At the end, the map of the region 
looked like a "leopard skin" due to the great number of ethnic and linguistic is­
lands created by an arbitrary process. Therefore, from the very beginning, the pros­
pects to avoid war in the future were not promising.
The First World War pushed nationalism to its pick in all aspects, although 
the triumph of national ideology was unexpected, and only hardly managed to 
prevent an anticipated social revolution3. The limits of its potential were to be­
come visible soon. First because of the impossibility of peace settlements to over­
lap ethnic and linguistic borders with those of the state. Second because it was not 
able to offer viable solution and help social and ethnic integration policies. Ironi­
cally, the new created nation-states became in fact multi-national on their turn, 
empires in miniature, but without possessing the political instruments needed in 
order to secure loyalty from their subjects. The tensions created by this unprece­
dented transformation, was to harm not only the relations between states like 
Hungary and Romania, but also former allies, like Yugoslavia and Italy, and even 
newly created states such as Czechoslovakia and Poland4. Ethnic problems were 
generated not only by the presence of reluctant minorities like the Hungarians in 
Transylvania5 but also by the tensions created between ostensible partners like the 
Serbs and the Croats, or the Czechs and the Slovaks6. The collapse of collective 
identities, as well as that of the utopian state project to accomplish a homogeneous 
nation within national borders, represented a source of permanent conflicts7. The 
political and cultural backwardness and the absence of a western level of develop­
ment and institutions were to become extremely visible after 1918, when national­
ism and the "social engineering" of the elites were to build up from the ground and 
at the same time, the state and the nation8.
1 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., pp. 67-68.
2 Erick HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1789. Program, Myth, Reality, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.136. See also Ion George DUCA, Memorii, Editura Albatros, 
Bucuresti, 1993, pp. 85-86.
3 Erick HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism...cit., p. 129.
4 Stephane YERASIMOS, Questions D'Orient...cit., pp. 23, 25.
5 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation-Building and 
Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, pp. 30-49.
6 Robin OKEY, Eastern Europe 1740-1985. Feudalism to Communism, Hutchinson, London,
1982, p. 161.
7 Erick HOBSBAWM, Nations and N ationalism .cit., pp. 131-133.
8 Ernst GELLNER, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983. See also 
Peter SUGAR, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe", in John HUTCHINSON, Anthony D. SMITH 
(eds.), Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 171-177.
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After 1920, the ethnic map of the region presented a patch work quilt of na­
tionalities and in the case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the Czechs and the 
Serbs as dominant groups were rather "minorities" among minorities. Discrimina­
tion against other ethnic groups became a general practice, and the intervention of 
the Nations League in protecting their rights led in the case of nation-states only to 
jealousy, distrust, bitter hostility, and the impression of unjust treatment from the 
part of their Western allies1. Beyond the euphoria of national liberation, national­
ism that was in many cases the only accepted frame-work was to provide quite few 
answers to the large number of problems raised by the difficulties of post-war re­
covery and the complicated task of nation-building. Self-determination and ethnic 
strife were not the only problems governments from the region had to face during 
the nation-building process. The aftermath of war brought into the region social 
turmoil due to the collapse of traditional authorities, starvation, unemployment 
and inflation2. The impact of the Bolshevik revolution and huge expectations from 
the part of masses triggered promises of social and political reforms from the part 
of governments3. Social democracy gained new importance after the war in Aus­
tria, Bohemia, and Poland. In Hungary the seizure of power by the recently created 
communist party of Bela Kun led to social and economic experiments based on the 
Soviet model, even if only for a very short period4. Similar attempts from the part 
of communists took place in other countries too, but none succeeded. The Soviet 
Army withdrawal from Poland after the "battle of Warsaw" in 1920 deter mined 
the Soviet government to proclaim the doctrine of "Socialism in one state". The 
Romanian military intervention in Hungary in 1919 put to an end the "Soviet Ter­
ror" for the next twenty years, but it also transformed bolshevism in a permanent, 
threatening phantom. Except for the case of Czechoslovakia, where the reaction of 
the authorities was less dour, in the rest of the region communist parties were pre­
ventively banned by the state. Though, it is not for sure that the communists were 
not to loose popularity short after coming in power, especially in rural, non-indus- 
trialized societies like the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Serbian one. The main prob­
lem in this case was represented by the fact that the governments disregarded in 
many cases such reactions as pure circumstantial ones.
Land reform, the "quintessence" of political, economic and social transforma­
tions in the region, mainly in those states where political leaders always proudly 
stressed the agrarian character of their nation, can be regarded as a good example 
in this sense5. The most significant aspect is the huge distance in time between the 
mo ment of adoption at the level of legislation and its delayed enactment. In many 
cases governments proclaimed radical land reforms in order to offer a first satisfac­
tion and an answer to the great expectation of peasants, many of them former sol­
diers, and a sense of loyalty to the state. In some cases, like Romania and Poland, 
the reform also embodied a strong anti-minority bias, and confis cated lands from 
Hungarian and German aristocracy and gentry6. From an economic point of view,
1 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., pp. 68-69.
2 Daniel MITRANY, The Effect o f the War in South- Eastern Europe, New Haven, London, 1936,
pp. 56-63.
3 See Erick HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism...cit., p. 129.
4 Andrew JANOS, The Politics o f Backwardness in Hungary, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1982, pp. 72-93.
5 See John R. RAMPE, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950. From Imperial Borderlands to Deve­
loping Nations, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1978, pp. 75-115.
6 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., p. 75.
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this reform did not improved the situation of large masses of peasants as long as it 
was not followed by any other measures, nor it affected in a negative way the eco­
nomic base of the gentry, as many were since the 19th century members of bureauc­
racy and state apparatus1. At the same time, the problems raised in the new states 
by different other factors where so pressing that even Peasant parties once in 
power, like Maniu's National Peasants Party (NPP), failed to introduce their pro­
gram based on rural credits and agriculture cooperatives. Thus, except for Austria 
and somewhat Bulgaria, agriculture and the peasants were rather "orphans" of 
the national economy.
Central East European democracy was no mirage, but it took, due to the cir­
cumstances in which it became victorious, a distinctive form. It was above all 
populist, molded by the romantic image of a common folk, and intensively nation­
alistic in tone, bolstering its principles with an almost mystical faith in the triumph 
of Serbs, Romanians, Czechs, and Poles. Three main elements shaped the evolu­
tion of political life in almost every country from the region. First, the existence of 
the "old guard" nationalist movements that still held great power due to their 
pre-war control on an expanding state machine, and a huge prestige due to the 
role played at the end of the war as artisans of the unification and creation of na­
tional states. Second, new actors came to the agora, many of them, like in the case 
of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and the Romanian National Party (RNP), repre­
sentative of their national minority in the Habsburg Empire. For them, the na­
tion-state was the expression of popular advancement, rather than an abstract 
ideal. Extremely sensitive when it came to democratic rights, and the idea of law 
and legality in its rigorous Austro-Hungarian sense, those politi cal par ties were in 
a permanent opposition to Pasic's or Brätianu's coercive policies. The third and 
the most important element brought by the period was the prominence gained by 
the weak in the pre-war times or newly created parties with an ideology based on 
traditional Christian tinge, and the idea of unique virtues of their distinctive rural 
societies, sometimes in total contrast with the abstract secular democracy2.
In general lines, the political evolution of all those countries included the in­
troduction of a full paraphelnia of parliamentary democracy and universal suf­
frage, social reforms, and the development of industry as an economic goal meant 
to bring the countries of the region closer to the Western model. Politi cal de moc- 
racy was affirmed in Constitutions promulgated in the 1920s, but not on the base 
of an integral "national consensus". Ethnic minorities, the Germans in Czechoslo­
vakia, and the Hungarians in Romania, sections of the allegedly state-building 
nationalities like the Croats, or even regional political parties with a strong local 
identity such as Maniu's RNP. did not participate on it, in an attempt to oppose 
centralism and the offensive policy of government3. Later on this was to inflict on 
the political evolution of the state more than the fact that royalty succeeded to pre­
serve its prerogatives in Yugoslavia and Romania, or that Poland was dominated 
by Pilsudski's personality and will. By 1929 in most Central and East European 
countries democracy was already established but it also encountered substantial 
difficulties. The complexity of the new states that lost their pre-war national homo­
geneity and the simple two-party political system was only the most important
1 George SCHOPFLIN, Politics in Eastern Europe, cit., p. 20.
2 Robin OKEY, Eastern Europe, cit., p. 164.
3 Ibidem, p. 165.
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and difficult to handle issue. Furthermore, the way in which governments de­
cided to solve it, by dismissing the national councils from the newly incorporated 
provinces in the case of Romania1, by administrative harassment measures against 
the Croatian Peasant Party in the case of Yugoslavia, and manipu lat ing elec toral 
practices in the former cases and Poland, as well as the role played by major person­
alities like King Alexander, party leaders like Brätianu, and ex-generals like Pilsud- 
ski, were to open the road for "directed democracy" and later on dictatorship. 
Heirs of dispa rate regions and diverse political traditions, with a political life domi­
nated by a kaleidoscope of parties, many of them simple coteries of an outstanding 
personality, those countries were not able to make much progress toward democ­
racy. In 1922 the president of Poland was assassinated for being elected with the 
votes of the minorities2, and in 1923 Romania a similar attempt of assassination 
against the politicians who gave constitutional rights to the Jews was organized by 
a group of ultra nationalistic students and future leaders of the fascist Iron Guard.
The representation of interests and the construction of majorities are, techni­
cally speaking, requirements in any parliamentary democracy. In the case of in­
ter-war Central East Europe the radical transformation, operated in many respects 
in a "surgical" way, throw together regions and populations of different nationali­
ties, with diverse historical and social backgrounds. The road of nationalism, which 
seemed to be the easiest one, led to the final disaster. Self-determination principle 
led in this "land between", where nationalism was defined merely in ethno-linguis- 
tic, religious, and historical terms rather than civic and political ones, and instrumen- 
talized in general by a powerful state bureaucracy, to complete fragmentation3.
In 1920, the Czechoslovak foreign affairs minister, Benes, claimed that the 
Czechs had had a measure of political freedom before 1914, and that they fought 
first of all for economic freedom. This was also a more or less common idea in the 
region. In Romania the leaders of NLP proclaimed the politic but also economic 
liberation and emancipation of the recently incorporated provinces. Many be­
lieved that the new nation states were able not only to resist by themselves but 
also to register progress in an open competition with the industrialized West. At 
the moment nobody paid attention to the destructions of the war, with grievous 
consequences at the economic level, and did not realized that the newly created 
states were not at all economical viable units within their new borders4.
At the end of the war, agricultural and industrial production stood if not at a 
lower at least at the same level with that of the pre-war period. After four long 
years of destruction and enormous consump tion, the deci ma tion of live stock, 
rapid depreciation of currencies, nugatory trade, and so on, were common prob­
lems all over Europe. The export in the case of agriculture based economies of 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary did not lose its potential, but it was replaced in 
the West by the United States and Canada, which became during the war the new 
world's granary5. At the same time, the industrial production of Czechoslovakia
1 Vlad GEORGESCU, The Romanians: A History, Ohio University Press, 1991, p. 321-324.
2 Jan ZARNEWSKI, Dictatorship in East Central Europe 1918-1939, Wroclaw, 1983, pp. 5-6.
3 Ellie KEDOURIE, "Nationalism and self-determination", in John HUTCHINSON, 
Anthony D. SMITH (eds.), Nationalism, cit., pp. 54-55. See also Anthony D. SMITH, "The 
Formation of National Identity", in Henry HARRIS (ed.), Identity, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993, pp. 129-136.
4 Franz HERTZ, The Economic Problems O f the Danubian States, London, 1947, p. 72.
5 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., p. 69.
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was reduced to 70% of its pre-war capacity. Furthermore, the peace treaties com­
pleted the task while destroying with the new drawn frontiers the unity and viabil­
ity of former economic spaces. As a result, towns, like Odessa for example, lost 
their agricultural hinterland, while headquarters and branch offices of many firms 
found themselves overnight in different countries where different laws and taxa­
tion systems operated. Capital markets were abandoned, and many newly ac­
quired harbors, like Bazias in Romania and Trieste in Italy, were isolated from the 
rest of the territory or simply abandoned. Communication systems were cut across 
in a way that made in almost every case nation-building more complicated and 
expensive1. Vienna as well as Budapest were isolated and considered former "para- 
siting centers" by the politicians in succession states. The paranoia which inspired 
such politics, and made the Czechs, despite huge costs, to contract a French com­
pany in order to build a harbor on the Danube and thus, capture the trade of the 
former capitals of the empire, was fueled by the media. In 1920 a Prague newspa­
per expressed the idea that:
"Vienna lives at the expense of others. The parasites of Vienna still live 
there. They see Vienna's only hope of salvation in the prospect of her again 
becoming a commercial centre. But their Vienna is doomed to ruin, and Czecho­
slovakia cannot be blamed for refusing to contribute to her preservation"2.
Similar ideas were expressed by the Romanian and Yugoslav newspapers 
with regard to the role of Budapest. The myth of the decadence of the empire was 
in this sense extrapolated from politics to economics. Recent studies indicate a 
rapid growth in the economic life of the empire in the last decade that preceded 
the war, due to massive loans from Germany, but also the efforts of the imperial 
bu reauc racy3. Nonetheless, this attitude was orientated not only against former 
Austria-Hungary. The economic elites of the new states that were members of eth­
nic minorities, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and nevertheless Jews suffered 
from the same political injuries.
From political discourse to political action there was one easy step to take. Vi­
enna was starved of coal by Czechoslovakia after 1918, while in the rest of the 
countries, governments carried out an intensive campaign designed to liquidate 
economic interests and presence of Germany and Austria from this region. Al­
though the peace treaties allowed Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to estab­
lish mutually preferential tariffs for five years, the suggestion was not considered. 
Even the French plans from the 1920 that tried to reorganize the former economic 
space were rejected because of the position offered to Budapest as a potential cen­
tre4. Conflicts were to arise even among former allies. Poland and Czechoslovakia 
were in a permanent conflict for possession of Tesin, and the coal mines of that re­
gion were the object of hot disputes. Romania and Yugoslavia were in conflict too
1 The example of Poland with its inherited three railways system is the most cited in this sen­
se. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the main lines of communications were orientated North-South, 
radiating from the old centres of the Empire, whereas the new country axis lay East-West.
2 Quoted in Franz HERTZ, The Economic Problems... cit., p. 66.
3 Jacques LE RIDER, M odernitatea Vienezä. Crizele identitätii, Romanian transl. by 
M. Jeanrenaud, Ed. Universitätii "Al.I. Cuza", Iasi, 1995, pp. 6-7.
4 Eliza CAMPUS, Ideea federalä in perioada interbelicä, Editura Academiei, Bucuresti, 1992, 
pp.14-15.
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because of the traffic on Danube. Fierce tariff wars were a way of expressing the 
new beggar-my-neighbor attitude1.
After 1918, in Central East Europe more than in the rest of the continent, eco­
nomic nationalism was at a premium. As Erick Hobsbawm put it, it was one of the 
facades of victorious nationalism and bourgeois nations that emerged after the 
war2. The reconfiguration of the political sphere, and the redistribution of political 
and economic power, destroyed the previous world economy. Furthermore, war 
economy with its planed capitalism, state control and protectionism, encouraged 
the governments in promoting autarkic models of economy, sometimes attenu­
ated by bilateral treaties. Nevertheless, completely subordinated to politics and its 
priorities, economy became one of the main instruments used by governments in 
order to accomplish nation-building3. In many cases the economic legislation was 
designed to discourage if not eliminate any major economic activity from the part 
of ethnic minorities. Apparently, economic liberalism faltered just when political 
liberalism seems to have triumphed. In fact the rejection of liberal economic princi­
ples shows that in the case of Central East Europe, liberalism was merely a way of 
instrumentalizing nationalism and nation-building.
New post-inflation currencies, at higher rates than pure econom ics made it 
possible, introduced by the local governments, followed by extensive protection­
ist legislation, nationalization of industry, capital, and underground resources, 
led in the first post-war decade to industrial recovery and in some respects even 
to a growth in production4. Decision-makers did not realize that this was nothing 
but a natural pick-up of economic activity after wartime stagnation. Only at the 
end of the 1920s when their isolationist economic policy started to cause some 
hardship in Czechoslovakia, more in Romania, and disaster in Poland, govern­
ments denounced the protectionist policy in which they themselves so enthu si as- 
tically engaged, and praised for a climate of free trade. The only problem in this 
case was represented by the effects of the great Depression from 1929-19305. Far 
from becoming independent economic units, the states of the region exchanged 
the tutelage of Austrian and German capital for that of Western Europe and Amer­
ica. The region was dependant on foreign capital and loans. Thus, not only politi­
cally, but also economically, the region was depend ent on support from the 
political forces which had (re)created it.
From the moment of its very creation in 1919, this Central East Europe domi­
nated by independent states proved to be a plethora of mutu ally hos tile his tori cal, 
national, and intellectual traditions, and a by product of socio-economic and politi­
cal backwardness, prejudices, fears and suspicions. None of the actors was able to 
surpass the situation, though many intellectuals and politicians have tried to. Un­
fortunately, time, which is supposed to play the role of the concilia tor proved to be 
in this particular case the main enemy.
Floods of book have been written about the Legacy of Versailles. Many au­
thors say that the peace treaty was not punitive enough in what concerns Germany
1 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., pp. 70-71.
2 Erick HOBSBAWM, Nations and N ationalism .cit., pp. 130-132.
3 IDEM, "Mass Invention of Tradition in Europe, 1870-1914", in Erick HOBSBAWM, Terence 
RANGE (eds.), The Invention o f Tradition, Cambridge University Press, London, 1993, p. 264.
4 See Ion George DUCA, Statul Liberal, Imprimeria Centralä, Bucuresti, 1924, pp. 16-23.
5 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., p. 81.
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and thus allowed its resurgence as a potential threat to the European order. Others 
insisted that the responsibility should be shared by the victorious nations too. Less 
attention was paid to the labyrinth of nation-states from the No man's Land with its 
network of alliances based on a preferential system. The issue of post war repara­
tion payment in the case of Germany as well as the situation created in Russia by 
the Bolshevik revolution can not be underestimated in explaining the war, but of­
fer us only to a certain extent an answer with regard to the events that took place 
in Central East Europe after 1938. The fact that a non-integrated Germany tried to 
regain its traditional sphere of influence in this part of the world might tell us 
something about the reasons of the Germans to start the war, but it can not explain 
the sudden collapse of the whole region. That was nothing but the effect of the Ver­
sailles peace settlements that split the region in two main camps and thus inau gu- 
rated a new symbolic geography.
Romania entered the First World War after two long years of neutrality, indeci­
sion and permanent negotiations with the Entente. The first aim of Bucharest was 
to escape potential isolation from the part of Hungary and Bulgaria, its traditional 
enemies. The second was the mirage of dreamed promises and the obsession of lib­
erating Transylvania, which fed the Romanian irredentist nationalism since 1859.
At the end of the war Romania was one of the countries that benefited the 
most from the Allies victory. The fulfill ment of national ideal and the incorpora­
tion of historical provinces with their economical and human resources lead to 
huge expectations in a better future. To the Romanian governments, dazed by mo­
mentary glory, the multinational and regional nature of "Greater Romania", an 
accumulation of astronomic sums, was no problem, like when nationalism would 
have sufficed to solve all unexpected difficulties.
At the peace conference in 1919 Romania was only hardly admitted as a co-bel­
ligerent because of her attitude during the war and the separate peace treaty 
signed with the Central Powers in Bucharest in 1918. None of the Romanian dele­
gates was included in the commissions where the issue of borders and minori ties 
status, both considered as crucial by Brätianu, were discussed. The Romanian 
prime-minister was shocked by the attitude of France and its reluctance in admit­
ting all his requests, thus recognizing the viability and legitimacy of "Greater Ro­
mania". Except for Bessarabia, which was not included in any previous agreement, 
the new borders of Romania and the status of the provinces remained an object for 
further discussions.
The response from the part of Brätianu came immediately. Only with difficulties 
he accepted the border with Yugoslavia, which included part of Banat in the neigh­
bor state. He firmly rejected the idea of any plebiscite and refused to sign the minori­
ties treaty, while in the case of Transylvania he fiercely opposed other border than the 
Tisza River1. Furthermore, Romania disregarded the articles and other stipulations 
concerning the free transit of goods and persons among the newly created states.
"Greater Romania" came into existence rapidly due to the adherence of the na­
tional councils from the provinces to the new state, and the massive presence of the 
Romanian army in those territories. In the case of Transylvania, were the helvetic 
model proposed by Oskar Jaszi was rejected in favor of full autonomy and a possible
1 Keith HITCHINS, Romania 1866-1947, Romanian transl. G.G. Potra and D. Räzdolescu, 
Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1994, pp. 306-311.
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union with the Old Kingdom on a constitutional base1, the following years were to 
bring an enormous disappointment. Not so much the aims of the Romanian gov­
ernment, but the whole procedure was to bend for the following two decades the 
domestic as well as the international evolution of the state. In many respects, the 
process of unification and than consolidation of the new Romanian state trans­
formed the political life into a "battle stage". For the liberals, the creation of a new 
institutional structure for the state, social justice and harmony, land reform, indus­
trialization, the nationalization of underground resources, and economic progress 
became new goals. Beyond this facade, they started a huge campaign in order to 
gain control over the newly incorporated territories. It was the beginning of a long 
struggle for power and resources between Romanians and the others, between 
centralism and regional autonomy. If in the case of Transylvania this struggle 
against Bucharest found its expression in the permanent opposition of Maniu's 
party, in Bukovina there was no such attitude after the retirement of Iancu Flondor 
from the Government, while in Bessarabia, due to the attitude of Vasile Ianculet, 
this issue did not exist at all2.
In April 1920, the government decided to dissolve the local and regional coun­
cils and introduce a complete new administration. It was the first measure from a 
long series of anti-democratic political acts that were to fit in the new political, so­
cial, and cultural agenda of the nationalists. The reaction of the elites from the 
provinces that felt themselves ignored, be trayed and margin al ized, was so strong 
then even the French government thought necessary to intervene3. The unification 
process was more or less transformed by the haste of the politicians into an annexa­
tion in a moment when it was no longer necessary. If that was possible without too 
many sacrifices it is due to the strong support of the intellectuals and the national­
istic spirit of the epoch that was to feed the ideal of an integral, homogeneous, Ro­
manian polity4. It was also considered to be a response to all unsettled ethnic and 
regional problems, and an imperative for any patriot, not only politician5. The 
new militant and aggressive nationalism became a profession for the bureaucracy 
and intelligentsia from the Old Kingdom but also for many intellectuals from the 
recently incorporated provinces. Institutionally and politically, Bucharest became 
after 1920 the cornerstone of the new state6, and regionalism or any other form of 
opposition was regarded as non-patriotic. The eradication of "homo bukovinensis" 
(loan Nestor) and "homo transylvanensis" (Onisifor Ghibu) in favor of the new "civis 
roma nie" became part of the new political philosophy. Local traditions and influ­
ences, as well as the supremacy of Hungarian and German elites were to be elimi­
nated, and replaced with that of new Romanian urban elite. If for historians the 
main task was to glorify the past, defend the national ideal, the organic nature of the 
new state, and the justice of Versailles system7, for other intellectuals the main goal 
was to uphold the policy of the state in its "colonizing mission". The emancipation
1 Gheorghe IANCUL, The Ruling Council. The Integration o f Transylvania into Romania 
1918-1920, The Romanian Cultural Foundation, Cluj-Napoca, 1995.
2 Sorin ALEXANDRESCU, Paradoxul Roman, Editura Univers, Bucuresti, 1998, pp. 62-68.
3 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural P o lit ic s .cit., pp. 162, 183.
4 Ibidem, pp. 7-14.
5 Peter SUGAR, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe", cit., pp. 171-175.
6 Radu DRAGNEA, "Muntenia care Unificä", Adevärul, no. 15, 1932.
7 Alexandru ZUB, "Istorism si Nationalism in Romania Modernä", in Alina MUNGIU-PIPPIDI 
(ed.), Doctrine Politice, Polirom, Iasi, 1997, pp. 136-137.
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of provinces as former hinter-lands of the disap peared empires, and their integra­
tion into the new state was to become for the intelligentsia the main target and the 
only possible way in order to realize "national consensus"1.
Kulturkampf, political centralism and "directed democracy" were not the only 
weapons used by the liberals in their anti-minorities and anti-regionalism strug­
gle. Romanian economy was also regarded by the government as a power ful and 
efficient instrument at hand in order to achieve as soon as possible the unity and 
homogeneity of the new national state. Its first task was to provide extra na- 
tional-distinction and to insure for the Romanian State the role of a great regional 
power. Therefore economic independence was viewed as an important guarantee 
for the political one, and economic borders overlapped with the ethnic and mili­
tary ones as to secure the preservation of the nation.
In 1923 Romania adopted the most radical land reform in East-Central 
Europe2. Same year the new Constitution proclaimed universal suffrage. The 
two reforms represented only the first answers to the huge expectations created 
during and after the war. The third main element was to be the new economic 
pro gram designed not only to improve the life standards of the population but 
also to insure economic, and throughout this political independence for the new 
state. The acquisition of complementary in their economic structure provinces 
was regarded as the pledge for a promising future, and a base for further develop­
ment. At the same time, Bucharest, the political and administrative capital of the 
country was to become the main financial and industrial center, capable to offer 
coherence to the new economic organism. Those three elements were to reduce 
the disparity between Romania and the West, and consolidate the new political 
achievements. All those goals were part of the political program of the Romanian 
liberals before 19143. The situation after the war was only to create a favorable mi­
lieu for the implementation of social and political reforms, and for the reorganiza­
tion of the economy on a national base. There was only one unresolved problem in 
this sense. More than 80% of the population worked in agriculture, the majority of 
them being Romanians, while the industry, transports, and banks were in the 
hand of ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, those were protected from outside by for­
eign capital interested in supporting and encouraging its investments. On one 
hand, the accomplishment of a national, Romanian economy with an industry and 
finance controlled by non-Romanians was unacceptable for the nationalists. On 
the other hand, any prejudice brought to those elites was to trigger reactions from 
the part of other economic groups from abroad, in a moment when the presence of 
foreign capital was necessary for the new state4.
The issue was discussed in 1922-1923 in series of conferences on political doc­
trines and strategies of development organized by the Romanian Social Institute5.
1 Liviu CHELCEA, "Nationalism and Regionalism in the Banat Region in the Inter-war 
Period: Resource Competition, Elites and Cultural Discourse", in Marius TURDA (ed.), The Garden 
and the Workshop: Disseminating Cultural History in East-Central Europe, Central European University 
Press, Budapest, 1998, pp. 114-125.
2 Francisco VEIGA, Istoria Garzii de Fier 1919-1941, Mistica Ultranationalismului, Romanian 
transl. by M. Stefänescu, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1993, pp. 22-32.
3 Ion George DUCA, Memorii, cit., pp. 104-107.
4 Mircea MUSAT, Ion ARDELEANU, Romania dupa Marea Unire, 1918-1933, Editura Stiinti- 
ficä si Enciclopedicä, Bucuresti, 1986, pp. 311-332.
5 Ion SAIZU, "Romania interbelicä in cäutarea unei cäi de dezvoltare proprii", in Alexandru 
ZUB (ed.), Cultura si Societate. Studii privitoare la trecutul romanesc, Editura Stiintificä, Bucuresti, 
1991, p. 104.
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Except for the independent Gheorghe Tascä, who advocate economic liberalism 
and expressed his opinion that in the case of Romanian National Liberal Party 
(NLP) the term liberal is a label with no significance1, and Virgil Madgearu who 
uphold the theory of a peasant state and rejected the possibility for Romania to fol­
low the Western path2, all participants, including the Social Democrats, endorse the 
ideas presented by Duca3. For him "economic nationalism" was meant to save the 
"ma te rial and spiritual individuality of the kin and avoid His conquest by other 
elements superior in their power and organization"4. Furthermore, economic inde­
pendence was intricately related with the political one and the idea of progress, 
and the liberal program based on rapid and massive industrialization, nationaliza­
tion of all resources, state control and protectionism, the creation of a Romanian 
bourgeoi sie and working class able to replace in time the "alien element", was the 
only solution. Similar ideas were expressed in a more radical discourse by Mihail 
Manoilescu5. A "...young and hated by his neighbors state...", Romania was to find 
its salvation only in industrial development. This was also to be the foundation of 
the Romanian civilization, the way in which national energies were to be exploited 
and national genius revealed. For Manoilescu nationality and nation was the only 
frame in which individual liberty was to find its plenitude. Party or class interests 
and regionalism were blamed as non-patriotic and doomed to disappear.
The intellectual and political milieu created by a resurgence of nationalism 
was favorable to the implementation in the 1920s by the NLP of an autarkic model 
of development, based on higher control of an interventionist state6. Thus, Romania 
was to follow a specific, national model of development7. Since 1866 the creation of 
a Western orientated state, including economic, political and social modernization, 
represented one of the main goals for the Romanian ruling elite. It is true that at 
the same time irredentist nationalism was in many respects the "core" of state pol- 
icy8. After 1918 this not only survived the accomplishment of the national ideal, 
but it was to become the response to provocations and deep political, economic 
and social crisis9. Paradoxically, the economic program from the 1920s was an odd 
combination of liberal principles, statist legislation, and isolationist policy. State 
monopoly on transports and industry, the efforts in order to reduce foreign capital 
and investments, as well as the export of raw materials and grains, were to affect 
in time the economic devel op ment of the country. The huge self-confi dence of the 
governments in the internal resources of the state10, together with the intention to
1 Gheorghe TASCA, "Liberalismul economic", in Dan PETRE (ed.), Doctrine Politice, Gara­
mond, Bucuresti 1998, pp. 128-142.
2 Virgil MADGEARU, "Doctrina Täräneascä", in Ibidem, pp. 110-117.
3 Ion George DUCA, "Doctrina Liberalä", in Ibidem, pp. 140-152.
4 Ibidem, p. 147.
5 Mihail MANOILESCU, "Neoliberalismul", in Ibidem, pp. 216-227.
6 Ion N. ANGELESCU, Politica economica a Romaniei Mari, Bucuresti, 1919, pp. 12-39. See 
also Mihail MANOILESCU, Importanta si perspectivele industriei in noua Romanie, Bucuresti, 1921, 
pp. 3-35, and IDEM, O noua conceptie a protectionismului industrial, Bucuresti, 1927.
7 Nicolae CONSTANTINESCU, "Nationalismul economic", Democratia, XI, no. 3, 1923.
8 Peter SUGAR, “Nationalism in Eastern Europe", cit., p. 175.
9 See Nicholas NAGY-TALAVERA, The Green Shirts and the Others. A History o f Fascism in 
Hungary and Rumania, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1970, pp. 365-373.
10 Ion N. ANGELESCU, Politica economica a Romaniei Mari, cit. See also Aurel P. IANCULESCU, 
La Roumanie nouvelle et ses richeses minieres, Librairie J. Gamber, Paris, 1928, pp. 23-39.
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obtain total economic independence1, were the main elements that shaped the politi­
cal decision of the moment. This artificial enforcement of a national industry and 
bourgeoisie not only proved unable to solve the problems, but it was to create extra 
difficulties, mainly because of the role played by state bureaucracy, the "Romanian 
pseudo-bourgeoisie" as Stefan Zeletin named it, as the principal agents of change2.
In the 1920s "Greater Romania" was a strange mixture of backwardness and 
minimal urbanization and industrialization. The infrastructure of the state, al­
though weak before 1916, was completely destroyed by war3. From the new terri­
tories more than 200 000 Hungarians and 71 000 Jews, many of them special ists in 
different economic activities, were to leave due to the new policy promoted by the 
government, but not only. For the Liberal party that was determined to imple ment 
its protectionist program, as well as for many of his supporters all the above were 
no impediments as long as the historical moment, the geographical position of Ro­
mania, and the vigor gave by the resentments of the past, when Romania and her 
new incorporated provinces were treated as hinterlands, were to mobilize the na­
tion and thus, back the economic program of the government4. Nevertheless, the 
moment was to offer the opportunity to prove that the Romanians are able to or­
ganize and govern by themselves and build a strong industrial, modern state5. In 
time, the effects of this policy proved to be disastrous, but in the 1920s, its promot­
ers, were indifferent to any kind of suggestions and oppo si tion6. Madgearu warn 
that though apparently grandiose, based exclusively on corruption and state con­
trol, and meant to satisfy national pride, the economic program enforced in 1924 
was predestined to failure due to its autarkic feature7. On contrary, for its support­
ers, this was the only way to avoid economic ruin, eliminate strong competi tors 
and intruders, and thus eliminate the possibility for others to include Romania in 
their sphere of influ ence8. In this sense a special attention was given to the eco­
nomic integration of the new provinces. Especially Transylvania and Banat came 
into attention because of their level of development and the high rate of industriali­
zation. The idea was to reorient, emancipate, and transform those terri to ries from 
hinterlands of the former empire that arrested their development into the eco­
nomic core of the national state9. Not so much economic reasons, but the strong 
anti-Habsburg attitude that had relevance for the nationalists, led to the total isola­
tion of these provinces from the former economic space in which they evolved till 
1918. For the government, the maintenance of any kind of links with the space of 
the former empire was unacceptable as it was to head to an ephemeral nation 
building. Not a single aspect went neglected. Like in the case of the land reform,
1 Diamant MENTOR, Independenta economicä, garantia independentei politice, Bucuresti, 1926.
2 Stefan ZELETIN, Burghezia romanä: Origina si rolul ei istoric, Bucuresti, 1925.
3 Romul BOILA, Studiu asupra organizärii statului Roman intregit, Cluj, 1931, pp. 10-12.
4 See Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural P o lit ic s .cit., pp. 22, 202; Francisco VEIGA, Istoria Gärzii de 
F i e r . cit., pp. 41-43, 55-62; Leon VOLOVICI, Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism, The Case o f 
Romanian Intelectuals in the 1930s, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 33, 51-53, 75.
5 Grigore ANTIPA, Rolul Academiei Romane in combaterea campaniilor de ponegrire a poporului 
si a statului roman, Bucuresti, 1940, pp. 1-4.
6 Virgil MADGEARU, Dictaturä economicä sau democratie economicä?, Reforma Socialä, 
Bucuresti,1925.
7 IDEM, Imperialismul economic si Liga Natiunilor, Cultura Nationalä, Bucuresti,1924, pp. 32-33.
8 Ion N. ANGELESCU, Romania si actuala politicä economicä internationalä, Bucuresti, 1927.
9 Ion AGRIGOROAIEI, "Economic Consequences of the Acomplisment of the Unitary 
Romanian State", Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire, no. 2, 1980, pp. 132-133.
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the ethnic problem was also taken into consideration. The industrial legislation of 
1924-1926 embodied a strong anti-minorities bias, and many Hungarians, Ger­
mans and Jews were if not totally eliminated from the economic life at least dis­
couraged to participate in it. The Romanianization of industry and its personnel 
was to affect not only the upper classes, as long as in many cases the owner of one 
factory was forced to employ more than 80% ethnic Romanians.
The attitude and the policy changed only with 1928, when the National Peas­
ants Party (NPP) of Maniu came to power after the first democratic free elections1. 
But the "open gates" policy promoted by Madgearu was to create new problems 
due to the Great Depression and the autarkic economic policy of the European 
Countries from the 1930s. In many respects the NPP was to pay for the errors of 
their predecessors. In 1934, even Madgearu was to admit that the time of free 
trade has long passed2.
The failure of the economic program and integrative policy in the 1920s was to 
determine the unstable, absurd, and sometimes tragic evolution of politics in the 
1930s. The huge gap created between masses and ruling elites, the burden of economic 
and social misery, corruption and distrust in state authorities, prepared the ground 
for the failure of democracy and the seizure of power by authoritarian regimes. 
From there to dictatorship, and later fascist upheaval there was one more step3.
The "by ourselves" conception that governed the economy after 1918, had lit­
tle significance in economic terms and was based on merely nationalistic and of­
ten propagandistic reasons. Its importance in transforming the agrarian character 
of the Romanian economy by shaping the preconditions that lead to the develop­
ment of industry can not be underestimated, but at the same time the negative im­
pact of national ideology on the evolution of economy should not be overcome4. 
On one hand, the Western model represented in the 1920s the authoritative criteria 
for the majority of Romanian elites. On the other hand, the frustrations created on 
a long term by this imitative context that led to immolation of internal priorities 
were to play the role of a centripetal phenomenon. The modernizing dictatorship 
and the fascist phenomenon of the 1930s were in many respects the final conse­
quence of the initial option5.
The explanation for the profound crises and the contradictory-fluctuant evo­
lution of Romania in the 1930s can not be restricted to conjectural, international 
factors6. The manifest isolationism that characterized the Romanian foreign trade 
with the exception of few bilateral agreements was to affect the country's foreign 
policy. No regional, not to mention federal proj ect was really supported by the 
Romanian decision-makers in the 1920s and 1930s. Even the idea of building a 
common market was rejected, in spite of the internal realities and difficult eco­
nomic situation.
1 Henry ROBERTS, Rumania. Political Problems o f an Agrarian State, Archon Books, New York, 
1969, pp. 150.
2 Keith HITCHINS, Romania 1866-1947, cit., pp. 340-345.
3 Henry ROBERTS, R u m ania. cit., pp. 202-203.
4 Ion SAIZU,"Romania interbelicä...cit.", pp. 105-109.
5 Keneth JOWITH, Social Change in Romania 1860-1940. A Debate on Development in a European 
Nation, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1978.
6 Viorica MOISIUC, Premizele izolarii politice a Romaniei (1919-1940), Editura Militarä, 
Bucuresti, 1981.
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The anti-revisionist policy that was the stalking horse of the Romanian diplo­
macy can explain, but only in psychological terms, such negative reactions in the 
case of Hungary, Austria, and Germany. The problem is that the same attitude can 
be underlined in the case of the Little Entente, where the antirevisionist bias can 
not be enforced as an argument.
At the end of the 1930s the instrumentalization of national ideology against 
the projects of regional cooperation has been fulfilled with negative consequences 
on Romania's economic evolution.
Real security could come in post 1918 East Central Europe only from a relaxa­
tion of international tensions and the improvement of the economic situation of 
the member states of the region. In theory, this was the task of the Nations League. 
In practice, doubts about the capability of the "Geneva spirit" to dispel aggression 
rehabilitated the pre-war system of alliances. Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugo­
slavia band together in the Little Entente in 1920-1921, and later on concluded 
separate treaties with France. With its limited, anti-revisionist aims and policies, 
this organism failed not only to attract new members, such as Poland, but also 
missed the chance to become a vehicle for regional cooperation and integration1.
On its turn, France desperately tried to establish in the region a confed er ate 
Danubian Union as to bridge the huge gap left by the dissolution of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and thus, create for its own benefit a "Cordon Sanitaire" oriented toward 
both Germany and Soviet Union.
The permanent state of conflict, and doubts on the viability and legitimacy of 
the borders traced at Versailles, were to influence the position adopted by Great Brit­
ain at Locarno in 1925, led to a period of "cold relations" between Britain and France, 
and encouraged Germany in its efforts to impose its visions and policies in the East2. 
The weaknesses of the nation-states of the region, and the absence of coopera tion, 
were to help in this sense. Nazi Grossraumwirtschaft proved once more that the his­
tory of the Danubian peoples was to be decided from outside the region3.
The aftermath of the Great War brought to an end the very existence of the 
great multi-national empires of East Central Europe, and took the solu tion of a 
possible coexistence of different nationalities into a Grossstaaten organized on a 
federal base out of discussion. War represented for many nationalities an opportu­
nity to create their own nation-state and/or bring members of the same ethnic 
group living abroad inside the borders of one state. The romantic enthusiasm of 
the 19th century motivated the accomplishment of the national ideal at all costs, 
and made many disregard the problems to arise due to the permanent rivalry with 
neighbor states, and domestic conflicts with incorporated minorities.
A third, possible way for the evolution of the little nation-states of Central East 
Europe was represented by federalism4. The contractual nature, the existence of 
a set of common institutions, the distribution of wealth, and confidence among
1 Edouard BENES, Cinq annees de politique exterieure, Orbis, Prague,1924.
2 Michael BURLEIGH, The Rise o f a Profession. Germany Turns Eastward. A Study o f Ostforschung 
in The Third Reich, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 10-12.
3 Gyorgy GYARMATI, "Conceptual Changes On Central European integration in Hungarian 
Political Thinking, 1920-1948", in Ignac ROMSISICS, Bela K. KIRALY (eds.), Geopolitics in the Danube 
Region, Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts 1848-1998, CEU Press, Budapest, 1999, p. 204.
4 Piere KENDE, "Three Possible Ways for the Little Nations of Eastern Europe", Altera, vol. IV, 
no. 7, 1998, p. 23.
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members, recommended it as a political solution to all past, present, and future un­
resolved tensions. Yet, the idea was utterly rejected, with the regional actors oppos­
ing even plans of a regional economic union as a first step toward the eradication of 
psychological distrust and political hostility. The problems raised by the issue of 
territories and borders, and the lack of social and political instability render impos­
sible any attempt to establish a minimum of genuine regional cooperation1.
To some scholars the failure of federal idea was due mainly to its extreme ra­
tionality. To others the explanation resides in the deep reluctance of the "heirs" of 
Austria-Hungary to support an anachronous, alien project incompatible with the 
idea of nation-build ing2. That sufficed as to turn a virtual political project into a 
fringe, banal, intellectual exercise.
The (modern) concept of Central Europe was coined in 1915 in Friedrich 
Naumann's "Mitteleuropa", a war and economic federal project with a "glamor­
ous" carrier after the Great-War when Mitteleuropa was associated with German 
imperialism, Drang nach Osten, Lebensraum, Realpolitik3. Though Naumann's ideas 
were to influence politicians like Karl Rener and Oskar Jaszi, it was for the Nazis 
to make the concept popular, at the same time distort and poison it4.
A mixture of modern capitalist, liberal imperialism, and Austrian geopolitics, 
Naumann's project was disagreeable not only to Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, 
Poles and so on; but also to Pan-Germanists who hold it as modest due to the ab­
sence of any consideration for the idea of Grossdeutsch5. What calls my attention 
with Naumann's project is the idea of a new political, supranational organism (hav­
ing Germany at its core), and of a broad economic union, based on monetary unifi­
cation (Zollverein) and the complementary economic character of the member 
states, that was to make possible not only subsistence but also competition with the 
more developed West in the new World economy that was to emerge after the war. 
The politi cal and social reforms, in dus tri ali za tion and democ ra ti za tion, which 
were to equalize in Naumann's vision the condition of all nationalities, transform 
them into one Wirtschafts volk and thus eliminate any potential conflicts, are also 
relevant for the discussion. Many of them were common ideas in the region before 
1914, and some were reconsidered during the first post-war decade as well6.
With the creation of nation-states and the deep fragmentation of the region 
such visions were rendered obsolete. Germany was symbolically excluded from 
the brand new Central Europe by the "heirs" of Kaiserliche und Königliche (KUK) 
and France, hoping that the concept will lose its peculiar German ring. Instead, 
other visions were to be imposed on Central East Europe, a region defined by the 
vulnerability of political arrangements, with imprecise borders and a variable ge­
ometry7. The presence of an enigmatic and unpredictable Soviet Union after 1917 
was but to urge the process8. The "inevitable" dissolution of Austria-Hungary,
1 Philip LONGWORTH, The Making o f Easter Europe, cit., p. 71.
2 Peter HANAK, "Why Did the Danubian Federation Plan Failed", in Ignac ROMSISICS, 
Bela K. KIRALY (eds.), Geopolitics in the Danube Region.. .cit., pp. 305-317.
3 Friedrich NAUMANN, Mitteleuropa, L'Europe Centrale, Neuchatel Delachaux, Paris, 1923.
4 Timothy GARTON ASH, "Mitteleuropa?", in Stephan R. GRAUBARD (ed.), Eastern 
Europe...Central Europe...Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 2.
5 Jacques LE RIDER, Mitteleuropa, PUF, Paris, 1994, pp. 124-126.
6 Peter STIRK, "The Idea of Mitteleuropa", in IDEM (ed.), Mitteleuropa, History and Prospects, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1994, pp. 8-9.
7 Ibidem, pp. 2-3.
8 Jacques RUPNIK, The Other Europe, Weindenfled and Nicolson, London, 1989, pp. 39-41.
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prompted intellectuals and politicians to look for solutions. Thomas Masaryk and 
Seton Watson, and their articles published in the New Europe are good examples in 
this sense. Allied diplomacy, both American and French, were also prepared to 
design plans of regional cooperation in 1918, but it was later only for France to 
make several attempts to put them in practice1.
Paradoxically, the welcomed by many collapse of KUK was soon to turn it into 
a symbol of "times of prosperity and peace". Victor Bauer's Zentraleuropa was never 
to become reality, for the simple fact that it indicated Vienna as the center of his fore­
seen economic and culturally vivant political organism, a dream reiterated in the 
works of many intellectuals and politicians, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Italian and 
French2. The case of Hungarian intellectuals and politicians, such as Elemer Hantos, 
Gustav Gratz, and Miklos Makay, is particularly interesting as it proves that revision­
ism was not the only Hungarian political reality, and indicates that federalism and 
regional cooperation represented for many the path toward reconciliation, an an­
swer to economic structural crisis, and a solution to security problems in a region 
under permanent threat from both Germany and Soviet Union that has nothing to 
do with attempts to undermine the status-quo established at Versailles. Unfortu­
nately, their projects and visions were ignored in Hungary and abroad, as the simple 
reiteration of the idea of regional cooperation, not to say federalism, and no matter 
the foundation, was to generate but suspicion and retrieve "ugly memories". A "mo­
dus vivendi" was not possible in inter-war East Central Europe as long as it was to 
reopen wounds from the past and underline the arbitrary decision of the Peace Con­
ference. In Hungary the motto for most mainstream politicians was "First justice, 
than Bread"3. When it comes to the beneficiaries of Trianon, the words of Edouard 
Benes are the best encapsulation of the victors spirit:
"There are at least ten reasons for which the accomplishment of a Danu- 
bian confederation is not possible: the first is that the states do not want this, 
the second....shall I continue?"4
With 1919, France also made huge efforts in order to create in the area a strong, 
anti-German and French oriented political organism5. In 1918, the program of 
"Comite Frangais de degermanisation des Balkans et de l'Orient et de la propa- 
gande de l'idee frangaise par le commerce et l'industrie" stated the idea of immedi­
ate replacement of German influence and the inclusion of the area into a French 
sphere of domination. Economic reconstruction after four years of war was the ar­
gument invoked in order to persuade different governments from the region to 
help France in transforming the region into an informal colony, control the trade 
and production, and create outlets for French industry6. France was interested to 
include the four victorious little nation-states of the region: Czechoslovakia, Yugo­
slavia, Poland and Romania; into a system of alliances patronized by Quai d'Orsay
1 Peter STIRK, "The Idea of Mitteleuropa", cit., p. 15.
2 Jacques LE RIDER, Mitteleuropa, cit., p. 137.
3 Gyorgy LITVAN (ed.), Homage to Danubia. Selected writings o f Oskar Jaszi, Landham, MD, 
1995, pp. 80-86.
4 Quoted in Florin CODRESCU, La Petite Entente, Pierre Bosuet, Paris, 1927, p. 329.
5 Jacques LE RIDER, Mitteleuropa, cit., pp. 142-147.
6 Virgil MADGEARU, Evolutia economicä a Romaniei dupä Primul Räzboi Mondial, Bucuresti, 
1940, pp. 46-49.
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and oriented against Germany1, and to create a solid ground for the economi cal 
interests of the French "big business" (Schneider Creusot, Impe rial Chemi cal In­
dus tries, Sol vary, Unilever) that already started to consider the region as a single 
economic unit, meant to serve their particular interest2.
The reaction of the little allies was unexpected. Edouard Benes and Take 
Ionescu disapproved the plan, which was considered an offense to the sover­
eignty and the equal status of all states proclaimed at the end of war. Moreover, 
the situation became explosive after June 1920, when a supposed economic and 
political agreement was signed between France and Hungary3. The fact that Hun­
gary, and immediately after Austria, expressed their interest in the creation of a 
Danubian confederation under French patronage, and the possibility for Buda­
pest to became the economic and administrative center of this organism due to its 
geo graphi cal po si tion, led to to tal and radi cal opposition from the part of Roma­
nia, Czecho slo va kia and Yugo sla via4. The creation same year of Little Entente 
was a prompt reaction triggered by the common anti-Hungarian and anti-Habs- 
burg attitude of the three countries. Moreover, the pro-Hungarian attitude of 
Quai d'Orsay was to create suspicion towards France as well. Till the end of 1920s 
no similar initiatives were taken by France. There is one more aspect here that is 
generally omitted by historians, namely that the situation created after the war 
led to a mimetic competition between the states of the region. The "great price" 
was the position of a regional power and a potential centre of a designed Danu- 
bian organism that France was to offer to one of them. Latter on, when French di­
plomacy opted for Czechoslovakia the situation did not improve, nor the spirits 
calmed down. Moreover, the relations between Prague on one hand, and Bucha­
rest and Belgrade on the other, deteriorated.
In 1929 depression hit the New York stock exchange, and was passed on to 
America's European debtors. In the years that followed, governments were forced 
to introduce exchange control as a basis for regulating imports. Trade between the 
Danubian countries in 1935 was one-sixth of what it has been in 1913. Statesmen 
gathered at international conferences to advocate a lowering of tariff barriers in 
order to get world economy moving again, and urge the poorer countries to com­
pete more effectively on export markets. Surprisingly enough, the politicians of 
Central East Europe expressed their reluctance with regard free trade. As many of 
them put it, the consequences of a direct compe ti tion on markets were to be ful­
filled with disas trous consequences for the young national economies of their 
states. The general request from their part was for a system of preferential tariff 
and agreements with the West. That was the political and economic milieu in 
which Aristide Briand and Andre Tardieu advanced their federal plans in the 
early 1930s. Nevertheless it was also the moment when the Austrian-German 
plan for a cust om uni on was proposed in 1931, few years after Kounden- 
hove-Kalergi Pan-European project, designed to pull out Germany and Austria
1 Eliza CAMPUS, Ideea federala... cit., p. 28.
2 Alice TEICHOVA, An Economic Background to Munich and Czechoslovakia, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 375-378.
3 Magda ADAM, Confederation Danubienne ou Petite Entente, Editura Politicä, Bucuresti,
1983. See also Jacques BARIETY, L'accord revisionnistefranco-hongrois de 1920. Histoire d'un mythe, 
Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 1987, pp. 76-77.
4 Viorel TILEA, Actiunea diplomatica a Romaniei 1919-1920, Sibiu, 1925.
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from isolationism, failed1. The same fate was shared by other projects as well. The 
Austrian-German Zollverein plan was rejected as a masked Anschluss, and a reitera­
tion of Naumann's idea of Mitteleuropa, while Briand's plan, although popular, 
could not surpass the plethora of disagree ments, suspicions and tensions that al­
ready existed among the participants2. The idea of economic coopera tion and 
collective security proposed by those plans were to influence another French Pro­
ject, restricted this time to the Danube valley. In 1932, by the time Briand's plan 
was already a "curio", Andre Tardieu made public his Confederate Danubian 
Plan. In general lines the plan was designed as to limit German influ ence and in­
trusion in the region through a new infusion of capital, and the introduction of a 
special system of preferential tariffs for the agricultural products3. Though it did 
not introduced the idea of recreating the former economic union (and market) of 
Austria-Hungary, this plan was also rej ected4. Czechoslovakia, was more or less 
reluctant, and stated that further consultations with the rest of the members of the 
Little Entente are necessary5. In Romania, Prime Minister Nicolae Iorga opposed 
it, and so did most of the politi cians6, including Madgearu, who said that the eco­
nomic Danubian union was not to improve the situation as long as 90% of Roma­
nia's agri cul tural products and 75% of oil were exported in countries that were not 
included in the project7.
Tardieu's plan was one of the greatest diplomatic failures of the inter-war pe­
riod. On a short term the effects of its failure were reduced. On a long term they 
proved disastrous. From 1933 onwards prices began to slowly recover, but by the 
time they did so it was too late. The states of the region were already economically 
dependant on Germany, the only continental power that accepted for several rea­
sons the "conditions" imposed by its Eastern neighbors. This economic depend­
ency was later to threaten and in some cases eliminate their political independence. 
With the beginning of 1936 the system designed to preserve the peace of Europe 
collapsed relatively swiftly. Munich was in this respect only the terminal point of 
a long, devious evolution.
The Little Entente was the most important regional alliance created by Czecho­
slovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, urged on by France, and oriented against Hun­
gary. However, far from being towed to French diplomacy, the three constitutive 
members of Little Entente were also animated by quite particular and sometimes 
contradictory ambitions. For the first time the idea of a regional alliance capable to 
oppose the decisions of the Great Powers came in 1919, during the Peace Conference 
in Paris, when the Romanian Prime Minister Brätianu expressed his opinion that to­
gether, the little nation-states of East Central Europe might have greater success 
during negotiations. The treaty with Austria represented the first opportunity to test
1 Richard N. KOUNDEHOVE-KALERGI, La lutte pour l'Europe, Editions Pan-europeennes, 
Hofsburg, Wien, 1931.
2 Magda ADAM, Richtung Selbsvernichtung. Die Kleine Entente, 1920-1938, Budapest-Wien, 
1988. See also Eliza CAMPUS, Ideea federala... cit., pp. 85-86, p. 89-112.
3 Gyorgy GYARMATI, "Conceptual Changes.. .cit.", p. 203.
4 Eliza CAMPUS, Ideea fed era la .c it ., p. 98.
5 George CIORANESCU, Romanii si ideea federalista, Editura Enciclopedicä, Bucuresti, 1996, 
pp. 123-124.
6 Ibidem, pp. 124-125.
7 Virgil MADGEARU, "Romania fatä de planul intelegerii economice a statelor dunärene", 
Adevarul, no. 14790, 1932.
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this idea1. The second important moment in the creation of Little Entente is repre­
sented by the first French attempt to federate the region in 1920. Due to the attitude 
adopted by France during the peace conference, and its pro-Hungarian attitude, dip­
lomats from Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia decided to stick together in 
order to make the accomplishment of a federal organism impossible. The reaction 
was so biter and unexpected that a French newspaper published an article entitled 
"The little betrayal or the undergrounds of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav policy", ac­
cusing the three of collaboration with Germany and of pro-Bolshevik attitude.
Between 1920-1921 bilateral agreements were signed by Yugoslavia, Czecho­
slovakia, and Romania. The initial plan, as designed by Edouard Benes and Take 
Ionescu, included five states and stated that in the future the alliance remains 
open to Hungary and Bulgaria. The last two were never to become members, as 
they represented the very reason for the existence of the Little Entente, and later 
on the Balkan Entente. Moreover, Poland refused the invitation, and so did 
Greece, as for them the anti-Hungarian bias of the Little Entente was of no inter­
est. On contrary, the relations between Hungary and Poland remained friendly, 
while those with Czechoslovakia became more and more tense. The only state, 
member of the Little Entente, with whom Poland signed an agreement, was Roma­
nia. Up to 1933, no significant change occurred in the structure of this organism. 
Many of the measures that were to improve its activity by creating common politi­
cal and economic institutions were not to alter the substance of the relations 
among the three states. A common policy was render impossible due to the differ­
ent approach of the three states in their relations with other countries, and also 
due to the inner structure and domestic dynamic of each of the members. From an 
economic point of view, the collaboration was restricted by the fact that the na­
tional economies of the three were not at all complementary2. Moreover, in Roma­
nia, the idea of Regional cooperation found little support and only for a very 
short period, as the country was in a permanent mimetic competition with its 
more advanced, industrialized partner, Czechoslovakia.
From 1933 onward, when Germany and Italy began to loom as a danger, 
Benes tried to revive the idea of cooperation with Hungary and Austria, which he 
had opposed so bitterly few years earlier3. Economically, Czechoslovakia was in 
impossibility to increase trade with its allies due to the fact that its market could 
not absorb huge quantities of raw materials and agricultural products provided 
by Romania and Yugoslavia. Therefore, in 1936 the Czechoslovak Prime Minister 
Milan Hodza proposed to include Austria, Italy, Hungary and Poland together 
with the countries of the Little Entente in order to create a vast zone of economic 
cooperation, a Central European Regional Entente capable to oppose Germany4. 
With the exception of Austria, the rest of the countries, including Romania and 
Yugoslavia, drew back from the plan. Germany's position and control over trade 
in the region was already too strong, and the particular interest and greed of each 
of her small partners too big.
1 Keith HITCHINS, Romania 1866-1947, cit., p. 306.
2 Mascek NIEDERLE, Ideea colaborärii economice a Micii Intelegeri, Curierul Judiciar, Bucuresti, 
1935, pp. 27-35.
3 Richard MACHRAY, The Struggle for Danube and the Little Entente 1929-1938, London, 1938.
4 Milan HODZA, Federation in Central Europe. Reflections and Reminiscences, Harrolds, 
London, 1942.
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In 1934-1936 Germany was far from being an economic independent state. 
The "policy of autarky" the Nazi regime emphasized was a pure propagandistic 
instrument. Goering's four year plan was to be accomplished only if the Os traum 
could be included in the economic sphere of influence and the states there trans­
formed into satellites or annexed1. Thus, the whole region was to be included step 
by step in order to help Germany wage war, and solve its domes tic cri sis2. For the 
German diplomacy the main task was to isolate each "targeted state". War was 
not so much the solution to be advanced, at least not in 1936, but the second wave 
of the Depression from 1937 forced the Germans to re-evaluate the entire situa­
tion. For Hitler, it was not for imperialism but pan-nationalist ideology to provide 
him with arguments and uphold the expansionist policy of his regime3. At the 
same time it is hard to eliminate economic imperialism from the equation as long 
as in many respects the aims of Nazi Germany were identical with those of the Wil­
helmine Reich4. Economics were to provide arguments as well, though for the 
leaders of Nazi Germany the interest in the economic potential of East Central 
Europe was limited5.
Hitler's path was also eased by many Western diplomats who consid ered that 
East Central Europe represented, especially from the mid 1930s, a "German back­
yard". Not only they were not averse to a future inclusion of the region into the 
German sphere of influence but also believed that this would represent a key to 
contain Soviet Union. In 1938-1939 it was not only for Chamberlain to express his 
reluctance with regard to any kind of military intervention in the Region. As Seton 
Watson put it, there were many to ask if the labyrinth of noisy, little nations of the 
"land between" deserve to be saved.
However the tragedy came "not only from w ith o u t.it also came from with­
i n . " 6. Hungary, for it had suffered the most after Versailles due to lost territories 
but also from the isolationist policy of its neighbors was the first to be targeted. 
The German offer, with its unusual method of transaction and special payment 
arrangements, was too good to be refused, and was to prove its efficiency in other 
cases to. The idea that, in the case of Hungary, the economic collabo ra tion was en­
couraged by Gombos's sympathy for the Nazis and revisionism represent more or 
less a "red herring"7. Except for Poland, which prided itself on its independence, 
the rest of the countries of the region greeted the German presence and succes­
sively entered the economic and than political sphere of the Third Reich. Espe­
cially in South East Europe the trade clearing arrangements were so promising for 
the exhausted national economies of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania, that the 
Germans practically meet no resistance in achieving the grain surplus, raw materi-
1 Berenice A. CAROLL, Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich, Hague, 
1968, pp. 34-37.
2 Ibidem, pp. 38-39.
3 Michael BURLEIGH, Germany Turns Eastward...cit., pp. 10-12.
4 Franz FISCHER, Les Buts de Guerre de l'Allemagne Imperiale 1914-1918, Trevise, Paris, 1968.
5 Not the same is to be said about the German "Big bussines" that made a terrible confusion 
between the Nazis and other political groups they supported before. For the German Big buss­
ines, expansion was to offer them the possibility to develop new industries and markets in the 
Danube region. See Hanah ARENDT, Originile Totalitarismului, Romanian transl. by I. Dur and 
M. Ivänescu, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1994, p. 341.
6 Jacques RUPNIK, The Other Europe, cit. p. 241.
7 Alexander BASCH, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere, London, 1944.
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als and oil camps. In few years Central East Europe became part of the autarkic 
German economy, with all parts benefiting on a short term from the new relation.
Czechoslovakia was another exception, as it was the only industrialized state 
from the region and thus, less dependant on the trade with a Germany in search 
for its traditional, pre-war sphere of influ ence. Yet, Czechoslovakia was soon to 
pay for its independence with complete isolation. France was to weak and depend­
ant on Great Britain after the reoccupation of Rhineland in 1936 in order to inter­
vene military in aid of its Eastern allies, while in Britain the government failed to 
convince a liberal society on the necessity and plausibility of a rapid and massive 
economic intervention in the region. Nevertheless, the other two members of the 
Little Entente did not encourage at all the Czechoslovak industry, and considera­
bly reduced economic collaboration with it. In Romania, Mihail Manoilescu re­
peatedly stated that Romania, as well as Yugoslavia, must develop its own 
industries, no matter the costs, and that the first step to do it was to discourage 
imports. Economic collaboration in the Danubian Basin and within Little Entente 
was thus reduced to "words".
After the annexation of Austria in 1938, Czechoslovakia was to become the 
next victim. Despite Benes's endeavors, the other two members of the Little En­
tente systematically refused to reorient the alliance from its anti-Hungarian role to 
an anti-German one. Soon thereafter Czechoslovakia was to suffer serious amputa­
tion from the part of Germany. One year later it was for Poland, "the bastard of 
Versailles", to disappear from the map. Romania suffered on its turn territorial am­
putations in 1940, while Yugoslavia was entirely occupied in 1941. By that time the 
Second World War was already in full swing.
Between 1938 and 1945, Central East Europe ceased to exist. With regard the 
tragic end of Independent Central East Europe, it is generally acknowledged by 
historians and not only that its collapse was engineered by the most ruthless re­
gimes in all history. There are only few those who are trying to find an answer to 
the origins of the Second World War in this part of the world, beyond the mephisto- 
phelic actions of Nazi Germany1. Was the slump of World War II a consequence of 
the Great War and of the peace settlements that divided the region into a labyrinth 
of small, weak and embedded by selfish, petty and parochial na tion al ism, states?
In 1934 Czechoslovakia refused to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany, 
as Poland did. Instead, seriously alarmed by the Nazi Germany potential threat it 
made a desperate attempt to extend the defensive military role of Little Entente to 
"any aggressor". The proposal was rejected by both Romania and Yugoslavia that 
were on one hand in good relations with Germany, and on the other hand were 
not so trustful in the guarantees offered by a weak France. In the case of Romania, 
the reaction was forged by jealousy on the position offered to Czechoslovakia as a 
regional power by the French diplomacy, the permanent fear with regard Hun­
gary, and the permanent anti-Soviet bias of the government.
In the case of Romania the evolution of the state and society in the 1930s, 
makes us reject the image of a victimized Romania2. The German upheaval in 1940 
Romania was possible not because of the work of some "fifth columnists". Coopera­
tion with Germany after 1938 can not be translated in this particular case in terms
1 Robin OKEY, Eastern Europe, cit., p. 179
2 See Mihai CHIOVEANU, "Victimising Romania. A Fictional History of German Expansion 
through East Revisited", (republished) Studia Hebraica, no. 7, 2007, pp. 123-141.
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of politi cal and military threats and reduced to strategic and economic interest of 
the Nazi regime in Romanian oil-camps, row material, and grains. The expecta­
tions of the Romanians have to be taken into consideration as long as the alliance 
between Romania and Germany during the war was not only a personal An- 
tonescu-Hitler affair.
Economic interest of Germany in Romanian grains, row materials, finances, 
and oil camps was great before 19141, while Romanian agrarian economy was de­
pendent from the trade with Germany, and viewed from outside as enfeoffed to it2. 
That explains why Naumann's Mitteleuropa include Romania as an important ele­
ment, and also why up to 1944 German remained the official language in business 
in Bucharest, in spite of the manifest sympathy of the society for French culture3.
At the end of the 1930s the instrumentalization of the national ideology has 
been fulfilled with negative consequences on the Romanian economic and politi­
cal evolution. For the weakened and undeveloped "Greater Romania" the subor­
dination to the economical, political, and military aims of Nazi Germany was the 
last chance and not the first choice. The entire evolution of Romania after 1934 
and not only in political but also economical and social terms led to dictatorship 
after 1938, and two years later the seizure of power by an authoritarian-fascist re­
gime. From 1937 Romanian economy entered definitively in the German sphere 
of influence and the new treaty from 1939 was only to transform the country into 
an informal German economic colony. The modernizing dictatorship of Carol 
was only to prepare the ground for the German ideologi cal, po liti cal and eco­
nomic "hectic ascendancy"4.
The slump created by the Great Depression transformed the European cli­
mate, helping Hitler to get power in Germany, and sending anti-democratic forces 
in government throughout Central East Europe. Long before the outbreak of war 
in 1939, Germany became a common presence in the region, and a role model. 
Much of Central East Europe would have probably fallen into Germany's eco­
nomic sphere even if Hitler would have not come to power. German foreign trade 
experts had foreseen the opportunity of regaining the economic hegemony Ger­
many had in the region before the Great War when Hitler was not yet a prominent 
figure. For the Germans, the new and vulnerable countries from the East always 
represented an open field for dreams of economic revival, territorial expansion 
and geopolitical influence.
Between the wars, few were able to understand that the new Central East Europe 
was the product of exceptional circumstances, and even fewer admitted that after 
1918 there were no winners in Europe but only losers5. When, due to the tragedy of 
the Second World War they realized this, there was nothing more to be done.
1 Klaus KEITMANN, Das Rumanenbild im der Deutschen Sprachraum 1775-1918, Eine 
Imagologische studie, Bohlau Verlag GmbH & Cie, Köln, 1985, pp. 48-49.
2 Keith HITCHINS, Romania 1866-1947, cit., pp. 168-170.
3 Klaus KEITMANN, Das R um anenbild .cit., p. 52.
4 Henry ROBERTS, R u m ania. cit., pp. 171-174.
5 Jacques RUPNIK, The Other Europe, cit. p. 241.
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